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One-Third The Way Home

The National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting is
about one-third the way home. After approximately six months of

work, the Commission has finished its first trimester, one which saw
numerous research projects generated, lively and free exchanges

among the members of the Commission on any number of topics, and
several presentations to the Commission by outside experts.

Between now and Summer’s end, the Commission will receive and
analyze various research projects — both third party and internal
— in preparation for major Commission meetings in September and

October.

At those meetings, the Commission will make final deci

sions on numerous issues, which in turn will provide the basis for
our staff to prepare an exposure draft of the Commission’s Report.

After approval by the Commission, the exposure draft will be
distributed for public comment on approximately March 1.

The

comment period will last ninety days, and we hope to analyze and
react to the comments and publish the Report in final form by the

end of another ninety days.

Commission Objectives

Those who have followed the Commission’s work may recall that
our fundamental charge is to analyze the whys and wherefores of, and

propose solutions to, fraudulent financial reporting — a fairly
modest undertaking.

Some doubters might ask — have asked in fact

— what realistic chance we have for making a positive contribution.
After all, the AICPA, FASB, SEC, Blue Sky Commissioners, hard-nosed

prosecutors, honest corporate executives, strong-minded auditors.

Congressional committees, and independent directors have not,
individually or in the aggregate, been able to eliminate fraudulent

financial reporting.

Some might even question whether any rational

basis whatsoever- exists for optimism on our part.

Although my views are tinged with caution, I believe we have
reason for optimism.

First, our Commissioners are all practical

people with much experience.

Their many combined years of experi

ence and insights bring together substantial judgment, plus differ

ent perspectives and disciplines.

Second, the Commission is ap

proaching fraudulent financial reporting as a multi-dimensional
problem, based on our belief that many factors contribute and that

the multiple causal influences must be identified and addressed to

provide hope for any degree of success.

Third, we operate under no

illusion that our Report will, once and for all, magically banish

fraudulent financial reporting in its many forms and colorations.
The problem of fraudulent financial reporting does not lend itself

to simple answers — the activity is as complex as human nature
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itself, with all its quirks, foibles, and eccentricities.

Fourth,

and perhaps the converse of having no illusions of grandeur, success

does not require that we solve all the problems.

Rather, to a large

extent success lies in identifying and airing the issues — the

causal influences — thereby setting the stage for further consider
ation of ways to deal with those influences.

With those thoughts firmly in mind — particularly that fraudu
lent financial reporting must be approached as a multi-dimensional

problem -- let’s explore the Commission’s approach.

Early on, as

the Commission attempted to determine its approach and methodology,

we found ourselves asking a number of questions.

fraudulent financial reporting?
contribute?

What causes

What internal corporate pressures

What individual shortcomings come into play?

What

failings of private corporations and of corporate governance con
tribute?

tial?

What broader societal and economic pressures are influen

What inadequacies of governmental regulations have an impact?

The mere exercise of asking these questions quickly caused the
Commission to reach a conclusion that we now believe to be

all-too-obvious — that many factors, players and pressures con
tribute to fraudulent financial reporting.

But if that is so, then

the good news be that many many approaches should have potential for

reducing fraudulent financial reporting.

Concentration on only one,

or a few, approaches/causes/solutions might be valuable, but "miss
the big picture."

Someone has described efforts like ours as trying

to remold a big balloon.

If you push too hard in one place, it
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suddenly bulges out somewhere else.

An even-handed, even-pressured

approach is the best formula to produce the right shape.

The Focus

So where did our Commission focus — on what players, what
factors, what influences?

ment.

First, the Commission focused on manage

After all, management has both the initial and final respon

sibility for accurate financial statements.

As the Commission

focused on management’s role, many questions that quickly emerged

turned out to be corporate governance issues — usually sensitive
and controversial.

The Audit Committee was a predictable focus, and we have spent
much time on that issue.

Questions raised thus far, without any

definitive positions being taken, include:

1.

Should Audit Committees be mandatory for all
publicly-owned corporations? Or for any group of
companies?

2.

Should Audit Committees have greater powers?
what?

3.

Since no source authoritatively prescribes the powers
of the Audit Committee, not even the rules of the New
York Stock Exchange, should we try to develop a list
of powers and responsibilities?

4.

Should the role of Audit Committees be more visible
and better communicated to the public? Would it be a
positive development, for example, if the Chairman of
the Audit Committee included in the Annual Report to
Stockholders his own letter describing the activities
of the Audit Committee?
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If so,

5.

Should the Audit Committee’s interface with the
internal audit department, and its involvement with
and attention to internal controls, be more publi
cized?

Those are but a few of the corporate governance issues the

Commission has discussed, all relating to the Audit Committee.

But

I emphasize that the Commission is interested in these — and all
other — topics only as they relate to or have potential for reduc

ing fraudulent financial reporting.

We are not embarked on an

effort to overhaul corporate governance generally, for we have

neither the time, inclination nor resources to do so.

Beyond Audit Committees but still loosely in the corporate

governance arena, the Commission also has discussed corporate
structure, environment, and atmosphere.
corporate culture.

You could call it the

Again, however, I emphasize that our look is

sharply focused — how does the corporate culture relate to,

encourage or tolerate, or discourage or prevent, fraudulent finan

cial reporting.

In that area, the Commission has considered, e.g.:

1.

Do certain management techniques — such as management by
objective and decentralized operations — lend themselves
to abuses more readily than others?

2.

Should more formalized procedures generally be followed by
everyone involved in the financial reporting process? If
so, what are they?

3.

Rather than attempting to prescribe new procedures, should
the Commission instead focus on other approaches, such as
more required disclosure about internal controls and
procedures?

4.

Should corporate management be required to express an
opinion on the adequacy of internal controls — an idea
once proposed by the SEC but later abandoned?
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Is the tone and atmosphere set at the top the most influ
ential factor? If the tone set at the top is fuzzy, are
all other controls and procedures predestined to be
ineffective? Can our Commission influence that tone?

6.

To what extent should the Commission encourage or propose
corporate codes of conduct or ethics?

The Commission also has spent much time on internal controls

and the role of the internal auditor.

That focus involves, at least

potentially, some issues of corporate governance and of corporate
structure and function.

In each meeting, regardless of our agenda,

we seem to come back to internal controls.

Beyond management, the other most visible player in financial

reporting is the independent public accountant — a highly predict
able focus of the Commission.

When considering the independent

accountant, we find no shortage of issues.
possible decline is one.

Professionalism and its

Beyond the general debate about "profes

sionalism," the Commission has focused upon competition and opinion

shopping, the SEC’s Request For Comments on Opinion Shopping, the
Auditing Standards Board’s decision to tackle the same issue, and
the steady debate about auditors’ ability and obligation to detect

fraud.

The Commission also has focused on the accounting profession’s

existing regulatory and enforcement mechanism and proposals for

change, as well as upon public concern about the potential impact of
non-audit services on auditor independence.

But, as I said in

reference to management and corporate governance, and I emphasize

again, our focus on these and all issues is narrow.
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How do they

relate to fraudulent financial reporting, if at all?

Can we

identify changes they would reduce incidents of fraudulent financial
reporting or otherwise lessen the potential for its occurrence?

We

are not interested in these issues as broad policy issues, as
interesting as they may be.

Only if we were to determine that some

change in the profession’s self-regulatory structure or in the scope

of services provided would lessen the incidence of fraudulent
financial reporting would we have any basis for comment.

After management and the auditor, law enforcement may be the
next most significant factor affecting the financial reporting
process.

The Commission therefore has and will continue to address

the effectiveness of the regulatory and law enforcement environment
in dealing with fraudulent financial reporting.

indifferent?

real issue?

Is it good, bad or

Is the regulatory and law enforcement environment the

Is more "regulation in advance" the answer?

Can law

enforcement realistically do more than discipline a few truly
egregious violators?

Law enforcement considerations inevitably take us to penalties
and sanctions — a long-running, sometimes highly emotional debate.

In that vein, the Commission has discussed issues such as:

1.

Are sanctions generally adequate?

2.

Is the injunction a stiff sanction or a meaningless wrist
slap?

3.

Are more criminal prosecutions and longer sentences for
white collar crime the answer?

7

Do they deter?

4.

If law enforcement and regulation are to be encouraged,
what about the effectiveness of self-regulatory organiza
tions in the enforcement area? How effective are the
enforcement mechanisms of private professional groups?

Research Projects

From the outset — given the Commission’s multi-dimensional
approach — reliance on third-parties for research assistance and
input has been a necessity.

As we receive third-party research

efforts, they will be analyzed, digested, and perhaps refined.

While some of these research efforts may gather information which
ultimately proves to be broader than our narrow focus, we intend to
confine our Report, again, to fraudulent financial reporting.

To reiterate an earlier comment, Take any of the areas I have

talked about, corporate governance, for example.

Our Commission has

neither the time, capacity, nor inclination to do a comprehensive
study.

Our focus of necessity must be sharp.

Can we identify some

aspect of corporate governance that has direct potential for
reducing fraudulent financial reporting?

With those cautionary words about our research efforts, here is
a list of outside research projects which should give some idea of
the breadth of topics under consideration.

Impact of Professionalism and Codes of Conduct on Financial
Reporting.

Financial Reporting in the U.S. and the Role of the SEC.
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The Independent Auditing Profession’s Response to Fraudulent
Financial Reporting.

How to Introduce the Issue of Fraudulent Financial Reporting
to College Business Students.
Expansion of Non-Audit Services and Auditor Independence.
Surprise Write-Offs.
How Internal Controls Can Help In Prevention and Detection of
Fraudulent Financial Reporting.

Role of the Internal Audit Function in Prevention and Detec
tion of Fraudulent Financial Reporting.
Individual and Situational Forces and Pressures Contributing
to Fraudulent Financial Reporting.

Corporate Structure/Governance and Fraudulent Financial
Reporting.

In addition, the Commission’s staff will be conducting inter

nal research projects on the following topics.

Analysis of SEC Cases. (A database of approximately 200 cases
has been partially complied and awaits analysis. Analysis
will include: review of prior studies, including work done by
the Cohen Commission; analysis of 200 cases looking for any
patterns and common characteristics; and in-depth analysis of
4-6 cases.)
Individual and Situational Forces and Pressures within CPA
Firms. (A study of the forces and pressures generally experi
enced by members of the audit team that may contribute to
breakdowns in audit quality. The purpose is not to reinvent
the Cohen Commission’s study on budget pressure, but rather to
gain a broader understanding of the behavioral dynamics that
operate in administration of typical audit engagements. Among
other goals, this study will evaluate SAS No. 22 — Planning
and Supervision.)

Opinion-Shopping and Competition. (This study will analyze
conflicting viewpoints surrounding the practice of opinion
shopping and attempt to relate these findings to the more
general issue of competition in public accounting.)

Reporting on Financial Condition. (This study will explore the
feasibility of the independent auditor’s assuming increased
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responsibility for evaluating and reporting on going-concern
problems.)

Red Flag Checklist. (This study will compile an inventory of
red flags from existing sources, other work of the Commission,
and risk analysis questionnaires of public accounting firms
and explore how this information can be used to prevent
fraudulent financial reporting.)

Second Partner Reviews. (This study will gather information
about second partner reviews in public accounting firms and
explore the feasibility of standards being established by the
Auditing Standards Board.)
Self-Regulation of Public Accounting Profession. (This study
will consider the regulatory environment in which public
accountants perform audits and consider alternatives.)

Quality Control Standards. (This study will evaluate the
existing guidance provided by quality control standards.)
Analytical Review/Operational Audit Procedures. (This study
will explore the usefulness of analytical review and opera
tional audit procedure in detecting fraud.)

Fraudulent Financial Reporting Framework. (This study will
evaluate the available literature on white collar crime to the
area of fraudulent financial reporting.)
Fraud Taxonomy. (This study will attempt to classify various
fraudulent acts and refine the concepts and terminology
surrounding fraud.)
Related Studies. (This project will gather information about
similar fraud initiatives going on in other countries.)

Guidelines for Audit Committees. (This study will attempt to
develop guidance as to the role of audit committees.)
Financial Reporting Process. (This study will attempt to
describe the financial reporting process, including its key
components and interrelationships, and explain how the integ
rity of this process is compromised by acts of fraud.)

Legal Environment. (This study will attempt to describe how
the legal system relates to and can impact fraudulent finan
cial reporting.)
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Possible Report
If you have followed my meanderings, you have a possible
outline for a Report.

And, in fact, the Commission has tentatively

decided that the Report will have chapters or sections along the

following lines:

1.

Introduction and Goals.

2.

Environmental and Individual Forces and Pressures and
their Implications for Preventing, Discouraging, or
Encouraging Fraudulent Financial Reporting.

3.

Professionalism.

4.

Effectiveness of Regulatory and Law Enforcement Agencies.

5.

Corporate Structure and Governance.

6.

Independent and Internal Auditing.

7.

Conclusions, Models, Recommendations.

Thus far, I have spoken about the affirmative — what the
Commission will do and be.

Commission will not be.
things to all men.

Let’s turn to the flip side — what the

The Commission is not attempting to be all

It will not be a prosecutor of any specific

corporation; an accounting standards setter; a drafter of specific
legislation or regulatory agency rules; an auditing standards

setter, other than perhaps in the most limited fashion; an investi
gator of all business practices that any segment of society finds

objectionable; or a panacea — the ultimate, self-contained answer

to all financial reporting and disclosure evils.
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Conclusion

Any effort such as ours causes those who are involved to
reflect periodically on the conclusion of the project, particularly

that result which others might label a success.

In thinking about

success, I suggest that the elements of success — like the problem
of fraudulent financial reporting — of necessity is multi-facted.
They include:

1.

The Report must be viewed as a balanced identification and
airing of the issues.

2.

A second determinant of success will be whether the Report
provides a basis for other private, public, and profes
sional groups to go further in certain areas — whether it
becomes a springboard for others to pursue matters in more
depth.

3.

Success also will be measured by whether the Commission
raises levels of sensitivity and creates a heightened
awareness among all — corporate management, the account
ing profession, regulatory agencies, and the public —
about the financial reporting process and the particular
elusive problem of fraudulent financial reporting.

4.

Practical guidance will be a major element of success.
For example, can the Commission identify common patterns
among companies that go astray? Can we characterize and
catalogue those patterns? Can the Commission go so far as
to suggest a model which has the maximum potential for
minimizing the incidence of fraudulent financing report
ing?

Thank you for your attention.
*******
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